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Abstract
Modifying a parallel dynamic programming approach to a simple
deterministic economy, we consider the eﬀect of an innovation in the
means of production. The success of the innovation is assumed to
depend on the availability of ﬁnancing, locus of ﬁnancial control, the
amount of resources invested, and on a random event. The relationship
between money and physical assets is critical. In this ﬁr s tp a r ts t r e s si s
laid on the innovation behavior of Robinson Crusoe in a premonetary
economy, then on his actions in a monetary economy in partial equi-
librium. Part 2 considers the closed monetary economy with several
diﬀerentiated agents.
JEL Classiﬁcation. C73, D24, G32
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21C o n t e x t a n d c i r c u l a r ﬂow
The title Schumpeter and equilibrium almost appears to be an oxymoron.
In two linked, but independent, papers we construct simple models that
achieve a mathematization of a fundamental insight that Schumpeter had
almost a hundred years ago on the need to break the circular ﬂow of ﬁnance
required in a closed economy in equilibrium when there is the possibility
of innovation. Our key concern is to be able to illustrate the relationship
between real assets and money and debt. This requires investigating the
nature of the cash ﬂows and how the amount of money, credit and prices
change in even in greatly simpliﬁed models of innovation. Stress is laid not
merely on the control of the money and credit supply, but their relation to
present and future physical assets (and implicitly) the evaluation aspects of
the ﬁnancing of innovation.
This ﬁrst essay concentrates on the physical resource aspects of innova-
tion. The second addresses the ﬁnancial aspects.
The remainder of Section 1 is devoted to a general discussion of some of
the issues that arise when innovation is introduced in economic models. Sec-
tion 2 is a brief discussion of the ways in which innovation can be ﬁnanced.
Section 3 explains the simple technique that we use to model innovation in
the improvement of a production process. In Section 4 we study innovation
models for Robinson Crusoe acting as a single agent producing for his own
consumption without the apparatus of ﬁnance. Section 5 then treats models
in which Crusoe is viewed as a small ﬁrm or the owner-manager of a small
ﬁrm in a large market economy. The ﬁnal section is a brief discussion of
some additional issues to be addressed in the second of these essays.
1.1 Equilibrium or disequilibrium
These essays are devoted to the speciﬁc task of providing some formal theory
on the ﬁnancing of innovation. But the emphasis is on the formalization
and to solving some basic models to illustrate diﬀerent control structures
involved in innovation.
We intend to utilize some of these models to construct experimental
games where process innovation is strategically feasible. Our goal is limited
to being able to provide a simple theory and to analyze simple models of
the ﬁnancing of innovation that formalize the breaking of the circular ﬂow
of capital. A related experimental game can be constructed and utilized to
obtain experimental data to contrast with the theory.
At even the simplest level there are many details to be covered and
3distinctions to be illustrated before we are able to show the nature of the
control system in a monetary economy with innovation. For this reason we
ﬁrst lay out the problems in innovation prior to the introduction of money
and the possible separation of ownership, evaluation and control.
The success or failure of an innovation in production is here modeled as a
random event with the probability of success being a function of the amount
of real resources invested. There is a single random event in our model. If, as
Schumpeter [10] implicitly suggested, there is a sequence of random events,
the modelling would be far more complex. Even a satisfactory deﬁnition
of what constitutes a reasonable solution is not immediately obvious For-
tunately for the purpose of considering many of the basic problems in the
ﬁnancing of innovation the single random variable model is adequate.
1.2 The evolution of control
Although our prime immediate goal is as noted above, a general comment
on the emergence of control and the increasing complexity of an innovating
or evolving economy is called for.
We begin with a study of Robinson Crusoe, who as a solitary individ-
ual cannot use ﬁnance.1 His optimization problem has constraints imposed
by real resources and his production technology. A mass economy faces
problems in coordination far beyond those of Crusoe. The introduction of
a commodity money and markets provides a means for coordination that
leaves the control of the quantity of money to the private sector of gold
and/or silver producers. The introduction of a ﬁat money provides a means
of exchange where much of the control of issue is centralized into the hands
of the government and a private banking system, if it is permitted to vary
the money supply.
In a mass market, Crusoe’s optimization is replaced with a similar type
of optimization but with more ﬁnancial constraints imposed by money and
weaker constraints relaxed by the presence of more commodities available
in the markets. Fiat money is more relevant and realistic in the study of
a modern economy; however the use of a commodity as money makes it
easier to study concepts such as the meaning of reserves and the quantity
of money in the system. The utilization of a commodity money without
other forms of credit imposes a well deﬁned physical resource constraint on
the economy. This constraint can be removed by replacing the gold with
generally accepted paper. This imposes somewhat diﬀerent constraints on
1Although he may ﬁnd accounting useful as an aide memoire, and with a stretch of the
imagination could set up a virtual market to calculate vitrual prices for himself.
4the economy and provides a government with considerable economic control,
but saves the deadweight loss of using an otherwise useful commodity for
transactions or reserves. In going from a real commodity money to a ﬁat
money an extra degree of freedom is introduced into the economy and aspects
of that freedom can be controlled by the banking system.
By ﬁxing default rules and monetary issue rules a government can bound
the price system from below and above in an economy utilizing ﬁat money. In
general the price levels in a system with any uncertainty cannot be uniquely
speciﬁed.2 Furthermore both size of issue and default penalties must change
in a growing or shrinking economy if prices are to adjust appropriately..
The system with gold is not as ﬂexible as the system with ﬁat. But
the ﬂexibility of the ﬁat system poses problems in the political economy of
control and evaluation. With gold both the mathematics and the physics
of the constraints on economic dynamics are well described. With ﬁat the
selection of constraints on the optimization becomes an exercise in political
economy. With gold government control is lessened and in particular the
use of gold considerably limits the opportunities for inﬂation.3
1.3 On simple well-deﬁned models and the playable game
test.
Our approach is to construct simple but detailed models specifying every
feasible move and all information conditions. Even so, with the micro-
economic detail of economic reality, they represent a gross oversimpliﬁcation.
We attempt to construct the simplest mechanisms for which the phenomena
of relevance appear. As they are well-deﬁned models they should either
manifest the basic properties ascribed to more realistic models or otherwise
they should serve to indicate why some phenomena do not appear until a
higher level of complexity is attained. The stress is on process analysis. The
economy is viewed as a fully deﬁned game of strategy.
The stress on the construction of an experimental game is made for two
basic reasons. The ﬁrst is to see if we can predict behavior in these simple
economic environments. The second is that when dealing with economic
dynamics it is easy to overlook apparently minor details that may have
considerable inﬂuence on behavior. These include being speciﬁca b o u tt i m e
lags, default conditions, constraints on borrowing, terminal conditions and
2It will depend on details of initial conditions and asset structure as well as default
and issue conditions.
3Whether inﬂation is good or bad for the economy is a question that is not addressed
in this essay.
5other micro-economic details that can be easily overlooked without the full
speciﬁcation of a process model or a playable game.
1.4 The circular ﬂow and equilibrium
In a modern economy much of economic activity calls for the use of money
and credit, both for decentralization and control. Money, credit and ﬁnancial
institutions provide the link between statics and equilibrium and dynamics
and disequilibrium.
General equilibrium deals precisely with equilibrium states. In spite of
its elegance and abstraction, as was noted by Koopmans [5], general equi-
librium theory is pre-institutional. Because the economic world is highly
complex and multivariate, radical simpliﬁcation is called for in the math-
ematization of the models studied. When process models of general equi-
librium are mathematically formulated even the convergence to equilibrium
from positions out of equilibrium in simple dynamic models may be diﬃcult
to establish. In contrast the literature on innovation is always process ori-
ented. There are some simulations of these processes, but the predominant
approach to understanding innovation is via the essay, often bolstered with
empirical studies analyzed statistically.
Although originally written nearly a hundred years ago, Schumpeter’s
work on The Theory of Economic Development [10] provided an insightful
description (in essay form) of a plausible dynamic process involving the
interaction of the ﬁnancial and physical processes of the economy intermixed
with the socio-psychological factors of optimism and pessimism. No formal
mathematical model was developed.
In the last twenty to thirty years there has been a surge in the writing on
innovation as is evinced in the works of Nelson and Winter [9], Dosi et al. [4],
Nelson [8], Lamoreaux and Sokoloﬀ [7], Baumol [2] and many others. Beyond
these works an understanding of the analogy between economic innovation
and biological mutation is growing.
1.5 Types of innovation
The study of innovation cannot be approached monolithically. There are at
least four distinct types of
innovation, namely:
• radically new product innovation;
• engineering variation of current product;
6• distribution, network, information and communication innovation;
• organization, cost reduction or other process innovation inﬂuencing
eﬃciency.
In terms of uncertainty they are highly diﬀerent. The most diﬃcult to
handle by conventional economic analysis are radical product and network
innovations. Both the production procedures and the demand acceptance
are unknown. There often is little, if any, precedence. The subjective proba-
bilities for success, if any, may be cooked up by stretched analogy with other
products and networks that have succeeded or failed; and only can be quan-
tiﬁed for the purpose of the construction of imaginary or pro forma ﬁnancial
statements used to persuade potential investors. They are also often subject
to “winner take all increasing returns”, as suggested by the insightful work
of Arthur [1] who develops a plausible probabilistic increasing returns to
scale model where chance determines who inherits the market, and the best
technology does not necessarily emerge.
More or less standard product variation ﬁts reasonably well into the
current theory of oligopolistic competition. The large ﬁrms selling, say, re-
frigerators have products that are close to being identical. It is the job of
marketing and the production engineers to have a spice shelf full of tech-
nically known modiﬁcations or additions that can help to diﬀerentiate the
product. Costs and demand can be reasonably estimated for such innova-
tions. Innovation can also ﬁti n t oam o d i ﬁed model of a competitive market,
as has been shown by Boldrin and Levine [3]. The cost innovation discussed
here can be considered in competitive markets, especially when one takes
into account that the appropriation by others of new ideas, industrial secrets
and expertise is by no means instantaneous.
By far the most prevalent form of innovation in most modern economies
is process innovation involving organization and frequently reducing costs of
production by orders of magnitude. New inventions call for expensive pro-
totypes. Even if the market for the new product is clearly present, over the
ﬁrst few years, especially with mass market possibilities, there is a consider-
able focus on unit cost reduction. The prototype is highly expensive and the
ﬁrst batch for sale, though cheaper than the prototype, is usually produced
at nowhere near the intended cost. The possibility to quantify a reason-
able gaming experiment with cost innovation and to provide a reasonable
scenario appears to be far easier than trying to construct an experimental
game to illustrate radical product innovation. Here we restrict our concern
to cost reduction innovation in a competitive environment.
71.6 Some behavioral considerations
Much of the work in mathematical economics and in game theory has been
b a s e de x p l i c i t l yo ri m p l i c i t l yo na na b s t r a c thomo economicus or von Neu-
mann man. This individual has perfect recall and an ability to compute
everything. In actuality there are many diﬀerent behavioral types that are
worth considering. (See [11] for a discussion.)
Here for simplicity we will restrict attention to the von Neumann player.
In a projected companion paper on an experimental game with innova-
tion we wish to compare the human (non-experts) with the “rational” non-
cooperative players of our theory.
1.7 Property rights, information and appropriation
Drive for show, but putt for dough.
Old golf saying
The modeling and analysis of innovation is replete with diﬃculties. In
much of the mythology of purely competitive markets adjustments usually
take place immediately. In fact, in a dynamic system proﬁt sa r em a d eb y
innovators having the lead ahead of the myriads of time lags in the diﬀusion
of information and expertise. The time it takes for an industrial secret
to leak, and the delays and barriers caused by legal, accounting and tax
considerations, are considerable.
Virtually everything is permeable at some point. Thus patent protection,
must be looked at as a time delay device and other barriers to entry as delay
devices. Law cases are often brought merely as time delay instruments.
In Crusoe’s world none of these details exist. At the level of abstrac-
tion in the next essay, these items, often critical to any serious deal, are
abstracted away. We also will avoid the introduction of taxes and subsidies
that are a part of everyday life. In ﬁnance many of the proﬁts lie in the
taking care of these details that arise out of equilibrium.
2H o w t o ﬁnance innovation.
In a modern economy there are many diﬀerent ways in which innovation is
ﬁnanced. They depend on many empirical details concerning the nature of
the money and credit, transactions costs, knowledge, liquidity, evaluation
ability, attitude towards risk, laws, taxation and other factors. In a complex
economy such as that of the United States many diﬀerent specialists may be
8involved. They include inventors, their families and friends, entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists, large and small ﬁrms, bankers and the government.
Among the many ways to ﬁnance we note ﬁve forms of ﬁnancing and
analyze several. They are ﬁnancing by:
(1) the owners with their own resources;
(2) the owners utilizing a capitalist or an investment banker;
(3) the ﬁrm utilizing retained earnings;
(4) the ﬁrm using a capital market;
(5) the ﬁrm borrowing from government.
In current United States practice much ﬁnancing for cost innovation is ei-
ther self-ﬁnance by the ﬁrm’s management and/or owners or an arrangement
between a ﬁrm and its ﬁnanciers. Government may encourage innovation
and may subsidize the ﬁrms rather than be a direct investor.
In the models of Section 4 below, Crusoe is not bothered with these
institutional details. For him innovation involves physical goods and his
ideas and ability, not ﬁnance, or complex ownership and expertise conditions.
3 Models with cost innovation
Assume that the probability of the success of an improvement in the eﬃ-
ciency of production (which in a monetary economy can be interpreted as a
cost reduction) and its size can be estimated reasonably well. To be speciﬁc,
we suppose that from the initial production function  for Crusoe, a new
improved production function of the form (1 + ) is obtained with prob-
ability () after a successful innovation. Here the probability () of the
improvement is a function of the resources  invested in innovation. With
probability 1−(), the innovation fails and the production function is un-
changed. For a given investment the improvement may be two-dimensional,
there being a trade-oﬀ between the size of the improvement and its prob-
ability of success for a given investment. We consider the one dimensional
cross section where a percentage cost improvement goal  is given and the
function () is the probability of success which increases with expenditure.
We assume that (0) = 0 so that an investment of zero corresponds to no
attempt at innovation.
I no u rm o d e l sw ea s s u m et h a ta tt h es t a r to ft h eg a m et h e r ei st h e
opportunity for innovation. In essence the ﬁrst move is a strategic decision
to take or reject a gamble to try to improve eﬃciency. The innovation is
modeled as a random event whose value depends on the size of investment
in an attempt to innovate.
93.1 Control of innovation
Before we can stress the role of ﬁnance in the coordination and control of
economic activity in Part 2, the models here show Crusoe in a nonﬁnancial
environment and then Crusoe reinterpreted as a small owner-managed ﬁrm
in a competitive economy.
Dealt with below are Robinson Crusoe
1. in a nonmonetary economy without and with risk aversion;
2. in a partial equilibrium or open monetary economy as a small owner-
manager with a money and borrowing or depositing.
In Part 2 we will consider an individual
3. in a closed economy with representative agents with a ﬁat money and
borrowing or depositing;
4. in a closed economy with a many small independent owner-managers
i nc o n t r o lo ft h e i rﬁrms.
3.2 Understanding money, prices and cash ﬂows
Before dealing with the models noted above, some motivation is oﬀered
as to why they are worth distinguishing and contrasting. Economics is
primarily about production and the distribution of resources. Finance enters
in as part of the enabling mechanism, but while the trading of paper for
paper is important in the distribution of risk, at some point the connection
of the paper with the physical economy must be made. History tells us
that the economies of the world passed through a nonmonetary stage and
then through a stage with commodity money and from there to ﬁat money
and an array of other ﬁnancial instruments some of which are close money
substitutes. A reasonable question to consider is how much does the nature
of the monetary arrangements inﬂuence prices and proﬁts. The models
presented here serve to illustrate the distinctions.
The models of Section 4 have no money, markets or prices. They pose
pure operations research problems including that of the adjustment process
of an isolated individual. The models of Section 5 involve mass markets
and progressively more complex monetary and banking arrangements. The
unintended consequence of a more sophisticated monetary structure was to
provide government with a control mechanism over the society. The models
here are purposely as simple as we can make them in the belief that the
10problems and contrasts among the diﬀerent monetary mechanisms rise at
a basic level. In particular the ﬁrst models call for pure economic physics;
there is production and consumption by an individual but prices, markets
and redistribution among individuals are not called for.
The models of Section 5 provide a ﬁr s ts t e pt o w a r dam a s sm o n e t a r y
economy with a given market price and a passive government bank that
is required to set an interest rate at 1+ =1  and to lend or accept
deposits at that rate. This is essentially an open or “partial equilibrium”
model without full feedback.
In Part 2 we lead oﬀ with a model that has a representative agent in a
closed economy. Hence price is no longer constant. Another model considers
independent agents in a closed economy with varying prices.
4 Robinson Crusoe in a nonmonetary economy
As a preliminary to a market economy and to ﬁnancial control of such an
economy, innovation by a single individual risking his resources, is considered
ﬁrst.
Consider a model in which a single agent, Robinson Crusoe, produces a
good for his personal consumption. Suppose he begins with  ≥ 0 units of
the good, puts  units into production, and consumes the remaining  = −
thereby receiving ( − ) in utility. The agent begins the next period with
() units of the good and the game continues. (Both the utility function
 and the production function  are assumed to be concave, nondecreasing
on [0∞) with (0) = 0.) The value of the game  () to Robinson Crusoe




where  is the amount of the good consumed in period  and  ∈ (01) is
a discount factor. For this model without the possibility of innovation, the
value function  satisﬁes the Bellman equation
 ()= s u p
0≤≤
[( − )+(())]
Assume that there is an input 1 such that 0(1)=1 . (This is certainly
t h ec a s ei f0(0) = ∞ and lim→∞ 0()=0 , as is often assumed.) Let
1 = (1).
11Theorem 1. (Karatzas et al., 2006) If the initial value of the good is 1,




· (1 − 1)
4.1 Innovation by Robinson Crusoe
Assume now that our single agent with goods  is allowed to input  for
production and invest  in innovation, where 0 ≤  ≤  0 ≤  ≤  −  The
agent consumes the remainder  −  − . The innovation is successful with
probability () r e s u l t i n gi na ni m p r o v e dp r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n =( 1+),
where 0. The innovation fails and the production function is unchanged
with probability 1 − ().L e t 1 be the value function for the game with
production function  without innovation as in the previous section and let
2 be the value function for the game with the improved production function
. Then the value function  of the game with innovation satisﬁes
 ()= s u p
0≤≤
0≤≤−
[( −  − )+{()2(()) + (1 − ())1(())}]
Let () be the function of  and  occurring inside the supremum.







To ﬁnd a solution to Crosoe’s innovation problem, we must calculate the
values of 1 and 2 where the quantity of goods is the amount () yet to
be determined. Theorem 1 only gives an expression for the value at one
equilibrium point, which is diﬀerent for the two production functions  and
. This situation is a mathematical reﬂection of Schumpeter’s insight that
the circular ﬂow must be broken.
The next two sections treat special cases where the value function can
be found for all values of  and the innovation problem can then be solved
explicitly.
4.2 A risk-neutral Crusoe
If the agent is risk-neutral, then there is a simple description of the optimal
strategy at every value of .
12Theorem 2. Assume that ()= for all . Then an optimal strategy is
to input  if  ≤ 1 a n dt oi n p u t1 if  1.F o r ≥ 1,t h ev a l u eo ft h e
game is
 ()= − 1 +

1 − 
· (1 − 1)
Proof. A player with goods  0 ≥ 0 can always consume  − 0 and then
play from 0. Hence,
 () ≥  − 0 +  (0)
Consider now  ≤ 1, and a strategy that inputs  . The best possible
return from such a strategy is
 −  + (())
But an input of  gives a best return of
(()) ≥ · [() − ()+ (())]
≥ · [0()( − )+ (())]
≥ −  +  ·  (())
since 0() ≥ 0(1)=1 . So it is optimal to input  when  ≤ 1.
Now suppose that  1.S i n c e 0 =1 , the Euler equation reduces to
0()=1  or  = 1. The appropriate transversality condition is trivially
satisﬁed since  = 1 for all  ≥ 1. It is easy to check that the strategy is
interior and therefore optimal
Consider next the innovation problem of the previous section for our
risk-neutral agent with ()=
Assume that 0(1)=1  and 0(2)=1  Then by Theorem 2,  0
1()=
 0








Hence, in this case, the solutions to the Euler equations are
∗ =( 0)−1(1)=1 and ∗ =( 0)−1(1[2((∗)) − 1((∗))])
To illustrate the solution, we calculate it below for a very simple example.
We will revisit essentially the same example for several other models.
134.2.1 A numerical example
Assume that the initial production function is ()=2
√
 and  = 1 so
that, after a successful innovation, the production function is  =2 2
√
.
Set  = 95 Solve
0(1)=1  and 0(2)=1 
to get
1 = 9025 2 =1 092
and
1 = (1)=1 9 2 = (2)=2 299







(2 − 1)=3 791
Assume now that the probability of successful innovation from investing
 is ()=(1+). As noted above, the ﬁrst Euler equation has the solution
∗ = 1 = 9025 so that (∗)=(1)=1 =1 9.S i n c e19  2  1,
2((∗)) − 1((∗)) = 3791
and the solution to the second Euler equation is ∗ =( 0)−1(1(95)(3791)) =
8977.T h u s(∗)=897718977 = 473 is the probability that the innova-
tion is successful.
We can use the formula from Theorem 2 to calculate
2((∗)) = 2(19) = 23741
and
1((∗)) = 1(19) = 1995
These values together with the values for ∗ and ∗ can be substituted in the
formula for the value of the game with innovation to get  ()=+1886 for
 ≥ ∗+∗. The value of the game without innovation can also be calculated
as 1()= +1 8 05, which shows the value of the possibility of innovation
in this instance.
144.3 A risk-averse Robinson Crusoe with proportional pro-
duction
Many of the interesting features of investment call for the consideration of
risk-averse individuals. In general, it is not possible to achieve the sort of
instant adjustment to a stationary state that can be obtained with a risk-
neutral Robinson Crusoe. However, analytic solutions are available when
the utility function has constant elasticity and production is directly pro-
portional to the input.
In this section we take ()=l o g and ()=,w h e r e is a positive
constant. (The full class of constant elasticity utilities is considered in a nice
article of Levhari and Srinivasan [6].) Thus the Bellman equation is
 ()= s u p
0≤≤
[log( − )+()]







The solution is ()= and does not depend on .T h u st h eo p t i m a lp l a n
is for Crusoe to input  for production whenever he holds  units of the
good. Under this plan Crusoe’s successive positions are
1 =  2 =( )  =( )−1




−1 log( − )=
∞ X
=1
−1 log(()−1(1 − ))










(1 − )2[log +l o g]
4.3.1 Innovation by a risk-averse Robinson Crusoe
Consider now the situation of an agent who begins with the utility ()=
log and production function ()= as in the previous section, and con-
templates the possibility of an innovation leading to an improved production
function ()=( 1+). As in section 1.1, let 1 and 2 be the original
15value function and that after a successful innovation. Then the value func-
tion 1() is given by the formula of the previous section and 2() is given
by the same formula with the constant  multiplied by 1+.T h u s
2()=1()+

(1 − )2 log(1 + )
and the ﬁnal term above represents the value to Crusoe of having the im-
proved production function. The value function  for the game with inno-
vation can now be written as
 ()= s u p
0≤≤
0≤≤−





log( −  − )+{1()+()

(1 − )2 log(1 + )}
¸

The Euler equations for an interior solution  = () = () can be ob-
tained by letting () be the function inside the supremum and setting its
two partial derivatives equal to zero. Here is the result.
1








(1 − )2 log(1 + )0()
The ﬁrst equation can be solved for  to get
 = ( − )
This expression for  can then be substituted back in to obtain
0()=
1 − 





This equation can be solved explicitly if, as in Section 4.2.1, ()=(+1).
In this case, the equation above for  becomes a quadratic. Using  =
95 = 1 as in Section 4.2.1. and setting  =2 ,t h ep o s i t i v er o o to ft h i s
quadratic equation is ∗ = 57 and, for this value, the chance of a successful
innovation is 57157 = 36
4.4 A comment on saving and assets
We have so far modeled Crusoe without durable assets. Prior to introduc-
ing money, this is done to illustrate the simple point that without durables
16Crusoe’s wealth is limited by immediate production. Hence his ability to
innovate calls for his cutting back on immediate production and/or con-
sumption. If he is able to store durables, there is no bound to his wealth.
A perfect durable may be regarded as having a linear storage production
function such that  → +1 The concept of utility or end use consump-
tion involves ﬂows rather than stocks. Durable assets may provide a ﬂow of
consumption or production services over time. If Crusoe’s island contains
a deserted town he might derive little if any direct consumption value from
its presence, but it could supply assets for innovation.
In the model of the next section, Crusoe has both a durable and a non-
durable asset. The consumption value of the durable asset is represented by
a parameter , which may be extremely small. However, the asset can be
used to increase the probability of success of the innovation.
In a modern economy the predominant form of real asset is a production
asset such as a steel plant or bank or computer center that yields no direct
consumption value. Furthermore consumer assets such as houses, automo-
biles and appliances yield a stream of daily services that are relatively small
in comparison with their asset value in a multistage dynamic economy.
4.5 Crusoe innovates using a long term asset
Suppose that in addition to his holdings of  units of a nondurable good,
Crusoe also has  units of a durable good that yield a utility of  in each
period, where  is a positive constant.
If only the nondurable good is used for production then his optimal
reward 1() will satisfy
1()= s u p
0≤≤





Here 1() is the value of the previous sections in which Crusoe held only
one good and had production function .






where 2() is the corresponding value when he holds only .
Now assume that Crusoe can invest any quantity  ∈ [0] of the durable
good in an attempt at innovation. As in section 4.1 the investment of  is
17successful with the probability () resulting in the improved production
function ()=( 1+)() With probability 1 − () the innovation fails
and the production function is unchanged. The optimal reward will take the
form









+ {()[2(()) − 1(())] + 1(())}
4.5.1 The numerical example with a long-term asset
As in the example of Section 4.2.1, let ()= ()=2
√
  = 1= 95
and ()=( +1 ) .A l s o s e t  = 1. It follows from the calculation in
Section 4.2.1 that, for  () and  suﬃciently large, that










we ﬁnd that the optimal values are
∗ = 1 = 9025 ∗ =( 0)−1(2(95)(3791)) = 34
with the success probability (34) = 34134 = 25.
5 Crusoe as a single small ﬁrm in a large economy
We model Crusoe’s entry into the market in two ways. In the ﬁrst model,
he is a utility maximizing owner-manager of a small ﬁrm. In the second, he
acts as a proﬁt maximizing small ﬁrm.
5.1 Crusoe as a utility maximizing owner of a small ﬁrm
Suppose Crusoe owns a small ﬁrm operating in a large market for a non-
durable consumption good. At the start of each period Crusoe holds a
18nonnegative amount of cash  and goods  T h eg o o d sa r es o l di nt h em a r -
k e ta taﬁxed price 0 Crusoe also bids an amount  in the market to
purchase an amount  of goods that can be either consumed or used as
input for production. Some portion of the goods purchased can also be in-
vested in innovation. In the monetary economy Crusoe can buy the desired
goods rather than have them in inventory.
Crusoe can also obtain loans or make deposits in a bank that charges and
pays an interest rate 0 For simplicity we assume deposit and loan rates
are the same. Crusoe’s limit for a one period loan is given by his expected
discounted cash earnings which are (1 + ) It is a commercial loan that
ﬁnances circulating capital. Crusoe can spend in the market any of the cash
he holds together with what he can borrow. Thus his bid  must belong to
the interval [0+ (1 + )]
After choosing , Crusoe selects an amount of goods  to put into pro-
duction and consumes the remaining − H eb e g i n st h en e x tp e r i o dw i t h
cash ˜  =( 1+)( − )+ and goods for sale ˜  = ()
Given a utility function  for consumption, the value 1() is given
by










+ 1((1 + )( − )+())
¸































Here ˜  and ˜  are the optimal actions at the next stage. It follows that
the optimal input  must satisfy 0()=( 1+)2 for any utility function 
with a strictly positive derivative.
Consider next the possibility that Crusoe devotes some quantity  of the
 units of the good to innovation that with probability () results in an
improved production function ()=( 1+)() Let 2() be the value
function corresponding to the production function  Then the value function





[( −  − )+{()2(˜ ()) + (1 − ())1(˜ ())}]
where ˜  =( 1+)(−)+ is Crusoe’s cash at the beginning of the next
period.
5.1.1 A simple example for the utility maximizing owner
Assume ()=()=2
√
 = 1 and  = 95 as in previous examples.
Furthermore set  =1and 1+ =1 
The Euler equations are satisﬁed for  = 1 =( 0)−1((1+)2)=81 and
any allowed value for  One optimal strategy is to always bid the maximum
so that the initial bid is  + (1 + ) and the bid is 1(1 + ) at every













= + 95 +1 6 38
Similarly, for 2 =( 0)−1((1 + )2)=9855, 2 = (2)=2 184,a n d +













= + 95 +1 9 71
Now let  () be the value of the innovation game as deﬁned at the end of
the previous section, and let () be the function inside the supremum
in the formula for  (). For our simple example, we have
()=  −  −  +  ·{ ()2(˜ ()) + (1 − ())1(˜ ())}
= −  −  +( 95){() · (1971 − 1638) + 1(˜ ())}
for  + (1 + ) suﬃciently large. Since  is increasing in ,t h eo p t i m a l
value is its maximum, namely ∗ =  +( 95).A l s o ,










If ()=(+1), then this partial derivative is zero for  = 79.T h ec h a n c e
of a successful innovation for this optimal value of  is (79) = 79179 =
44
5.2 Crusoe as a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm
Consider now Crusoe as a small ﬁrm in a large economy. In each period the
ﬁrm holds goods  ≥ 0 which are to be sold in a market for cash at a ﬁxed
price 0.T h eﬁrm also bids cash in the market to buy goods as input for
production. The ﬁrm holds no cash, but can borrow from a bank at interest
rate  ≥ 0. The bound on the ﬁrm’s loan is the amount (1+),w h i c hi s
t h em o s tt h a tt h eﬁrm can pay back with interest at the end of the period.
Thus the ﬁrm borrows and bids an amount  ∈ [0(1 + )] to purchase
goods  =  as input for production. The proﬁt  of the ﬁrm in the period
is its income less what it must pay back to the bank, namely
 =  − (1 + )
The proﬁti sp a i di ne a c hp e r i o dt ot h eﬁrm’s owners, and the ﬁrm begins
the next period with goods ˜  = ().




(1 + )−1 · 
where  is the proﬁti nt h en t hp e r i o d .T h eﬁrm has the Bellman equation:
 ()= s u p
0≤≤(1+)




Assume that there is an input 3 such that 0(3)=( 1+)2,a n dl e t
3 = (3). The following theorem is analogous to Theorem 2 as is its proof.
Theorem 3. An optimal strategy for the ﬁrm is to make the maximum bid
(1 + ) if (1 + )  3 a n dt ob i d∗ = 3 if 3 ≤ (1 + ).I n t h e
l a t t e rc a s e ,t h ev a l u eo ft h eg a m ei s
 ()= − ∗(1 + )+
1

(3 − ∗(1 + ))
21Notice that when 1+ =1 ,t h ef a c t o r1 in the formula of Theorem
3 corresponds to the factor (1 − ) in Theorem 2. However,
3 =( 0)−1((1 + )2)=( 0)−1(12)
whereas in Theorem 2, 1 =( 0)−1(1). The reason for this diﬀerence in
inputs is that Robinson Crusoe is able to consume the production from his
input in the next period, but the ﬁrm must wait an additional period to
realize the proﬁt from its input.
5.2.1 Innovation by Crusoe’s ﬁrm
Suppose now that, in the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm bids  +  ∈ [0(1 + )]
to purchase goods ( + ), inputs  for production and invests  in
innovation. If the innovation succeeds, the ﬁrm will then have the improved
production function  =( 1+) to use in future periods. Let 1 be the
ﬁrm’s value function for the original production function  and let 2 be the
value function corresponding to .I f() is the probability of a successful
innovation, then the value function  () of the game with innovation satisﬁes
the Bellman equation:
















Suppose that 0(3)=( 1+)2 = 0(4).I f ()(1 + ) ≥ max{3 4},
then, by Theorem 3,















· 0()[2(()) − 1(())]
22It follows that, for an interior maximum, we must have
∗ = ∗ = 3 =( 0)−1((1 + )2)
and






5.2.2 A simple example for the ﬁrm
Assume as in Section 5.1.1 that ()=2
√
 = 1=1 1+ =1 (95)
and ()=( +1 ) .T h e n
∗ = ∗ = 3 =( 0)−1(1(95)2)=81
and
3 = (3)=1 8
Also, set
4 =( 0)−1(1(95)2)=99 4 = (4)=2 19
Now use Theorem 3 to calculate
1((∗)) = 1(18) = 18 − (81)(95) + 19(18 − (81)(95)) = 1895








and (∗)=81(181) = 45.T h u s t h e ﬁrm’s chance of a successful in-
novation is about the same as that of the risk-neutral utility maximizer in
Section 5.1.1. This is not surprising since the ﬁrm’s utility is also linear.
5.3 The ﬁrm’s innovation ﬁnanced by long-term loans
As in the previous section, Crusoe here plays the role of a proﬁt maximizing
small ﬁrm. As before the ﬁrm holds goods  and can obtain short-term loans
from a central bank at interest rate  to ﬁnance production in each period.
However, the ﬁrm’s investment in innovation is now ﬁnanced by a long-term
loan from an investment bank that sets an upper bound  ≥ 0 on such
loans. If the ﬁrm borrows an amount  ∈ [0] from the investment bank,
23then it is required to pay back  in every period. Such a loan is sometimes
called a perpetuity.
In any period after the ﬁr s t ,C r u s o ew i l lb e g i nw i t ha na m o u n to fg o o d s
 ≥ 0 and long-term debt  ≥ 0. Since he is obligated to pay the investment
bank  is each period, the central bank now sets the limit on his short-term
loans at (1 + ) −  (or zero if this bound is negative). Crusoe’s value
function now becomes
1()= s u p
0≤≤(1+)−




when the production function is .
Let 3 be an input such that 0(3)=( 1+)2 as in Section 5.2. If
3 ≤ (1 + ) − , then the optimal action for the ﬁrm is  = 3 as in
Theorem 3. Indeed, the only diﬀerence from the problem faced by the ﬁrm







(1 + )2 + ···= (1 + )
Hence,
1()=1() − (1 + )
where 1() is the value of the game in 5.2.
Next let 2() be the value when the ﬁrm has production function
 =( 1+) a n ds t a r t sw i t hg o o d s and long-term debt .I f4 is an input
such that (4)=( 1+)2 and 4 ≤ (1 + ) − ,t h e n
2()=2() − (1 + )
where again 2() is the value for the game of Section 5.2 with production
function .
Suppose now that Crusoe begins with goods 0 and considers the
possibility of ﬁnancing innovation by a long-term loan. His value function
 () is then the supremum over  and  such that 0 ≤  ≤  and 0 ≤  ≤
(1 + ) −  of the expression





 − (1 + )( + )+
1
1+
{()2(()) + (1 − ())1(())}
24This is the same algebraic expression, with  in place of ,t h a tw eh a df o r
the value  () in Section 5.2.1. So an interior solution to the short-term
problem in Section 5.2.1 will also be a solution to the long-term ﬁnancing
problem. However, since Crusoe’s daily payments of  for the long-term
loan are smaller than the one payment of (1 + ) for the short-term loan,
it may happen that the long-term loan is feasible when the short-term loan
is not.
6 Ownership and control in a monetary economy
6.1 Three levels of modeling
There are several levels for the modeling of competitors. In this ﬁrst essay
we deal only with the ﬁrst one
The nonatomic agent
The ﬁrst has a minute or non-atomic individual agent manufacturer-
consumer approach is strategically just a step up from Robinson Crusoe.
This has an insigniﬁcantly sized owner run ﬁr me m b e d d e di nl a r g em a r k e t s .
In essence there is no market feedback, it can be considered as a partial
equilibrium or open model and one need not worry about conservation.
The next two are covered at the start of Part 2.
T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n t
The second has a representative agent who is a price-taker like the
nonatomic agents glued together, and the full macroeconomic feedback from
the closed economy is considered.
The full measure of independent agents
The third model deals with a closed economy with full feed back from a
multitude of independent agents.
The representative agent and full measure of independent agents appear
to be the same when there is no exogenous uncertainty present, but the
basic diﬀerences become clear as soon as uncertainty is introduced
6.2 Innovation over many periods
In all of the models analyzed above the basic theme has been that of a
single individual, ﬁrst in an isolated non-monetary world and then in a
large monetary world . Our concern has been with his decision to innovate.
We have however limited the analysis to a single decision. We close with one
more model where the individual may have the opportunity to try several
times until either she succeeds or her credit runs out
256.2.1 Repeated attempts at innovation by a ﬁrm
The model with repeated attempts at innovation until success is a direct
extension of the model in 5.2.1. The only diﬀerence is that, after a failed
attempt at innovation the ﬁrm is free to try again. The Bellman equation
for the value function  () will be the same as in 5.2.1 except that in the ex-
pression for the function (), 1(()) must be replaced by  (()).
The reason is that after a failed attempt, the ﬁrm faces the same problem
again but with the quantity of goods  replaced by (). For large enough
values of  the optimal initial bid ∗ = ∗ is the same as in 5.2.1, and the
expression for the optimal ∗ is also the same except that 1((∗)) must be
replaced by  ((∗)). However, we do not have an analytic expression for 
comparable to that of Theorem 3. So the calculation of ∗ seems to be more
diﬃcult. If (∗) is suﬃciently large so that the bids ∗ and ∗ are feasible
(i.e. ∗ + ∗ ≤ (∗)(1 + )), then the optimal policy will be to continue
to make these bids until the innovation attempt is successful. If he is rich
enough, success will occur eventually with probability one if (∗)  0.
A somewhat more complicated but economically reasonable model would
include the possibility that a successful innovator would continue to try for
a subsequent innovation. This opens up problems with increasing returns
to scale [1] that we do not deal with in this essay although the model would
be highly related to the one above.
6.3 Innovation and the emerging ﬁnancial structure
From a view point of the economics the models have been quite simple;
but in our layering on the complexities starting with the ﬁrst non-monetary
individualistic models where ownership and control are clearly uniﬁed we are
able to trace the needs for the emergence of various ﬁnancial instruments
and their role and to contrast them with their counterparts, if any in an
autarchic nonmonetary world. The speciﬁc observations are noted below:
1. The availability of durable assets are critical for Crusoe, but for the
small individual in a large economy with many assets for sale; money
is in general the surrogate for all marketable assets.
2. The problem of the separation between ownership and control does not
appear in Crusoe’s world. It comes into benign a multiperson economy
that distinguishes real persons from corporate persons
3. Short term loans in our models are, in essence commercial loans for
circulating capital, or “bills”with essentially no risk attached to them
26that are repaid immediately after “goods-in-process” have been pro-
duced and sold. The constraints on how large they should be are made
under the assumption that the bank can forecast accurately in the very
short term
4. Long term loans are qualitatively diﬀerent from short term loans and
even assuming no exogenous uncertainty, are called for even when the
dynamics promises a stream of proﬁts easily suﬃcient to repay the
loan with interest, but with cash ﬂows that are insuﬃcient to repay
the loan in a single period.
5. The evaluation of the credit worthiness of an innovator who wishes to
borrow beyond the liquidation value of his assets is virtually an art
form for the venture capitalist This is why the parameter “´ D” in our
models has no formula attached to it. In our multistage model above
in 6.2. an innovator who fails can only try again if his credit line now
shrunk to D-d is large enough. In fact after the ﬁrst failure there would
be a readjustment of D based on the old banking adage of Character,
Competence and Collateral.
6. As soon as there are two diﬀerent types of loans, seniority questions
must be speciﬁed. They are implicitly present in our models in the
need for default conditions that we have not speciﬁed. We would
get away without having to specify them when examining equilibrium
conditions that are default free whereas the dynamics of these models
could easily involve default. At the expense of several more constraints
they can be made explicit in our models.
7. In general in the transformation from the self-suﬃcient Crusoe, the
ﬁnancial system of a monetary economy is the control and perception
mechanism of a multi-person economy. The roles of ﬁnance both in
perception and control must be accounted for. In the mathematics the
constraints reﬂect the control; but for the most part the evaluation of
the constraints lie out of the model depending on how risk assessment
and due diligence is performed.
8. The last point concerns the ﬁnanciers themselves. In this essay we have
concentrated on Crusoe and the ﬁrm. The resource bounds an Crusoe’s
economy were only physical involving real assets. The resource bounds
on the monetary economy involves the availability of real assets and
money hence the creation and destruction of outside money, which is
27a virtual real asset, by the government or banks plays a role that has
n o tb e e nc o v e r e di nt h i se s s a y .
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